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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually and 
as Trustee of MILTON R. GOFF TRUST, 
an unincorporated association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON, INC., 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation; and FRONTIER 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
REPLY AND CROSS RESPONDENT BRIEF OF SAMPSON 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents in their "Statement of the Case" (Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 2-6) have improperly asserted material which is not relevant to 
this section of the Brief. For example, the discussion concerning the 
Osborn judgment (Respondent's Brief, pp. 2-3) has no relevance to the 
procedural context of this case since the Osborn litigation is not now 
in issue. The Osborn judgment procedure, if it has any relevance, goes 
to the question of the lower court's finding of improper conduct by 
Sampson which is discussed in the Argument sections of both Briefs. 
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Aside from this improper inclusion, it should also be noted that 
Respondents failed to mention that the Osborn judgment was only 
purchased by Sampson in 1981 after all negotiations had failed and 
after all attorney-client relationships had ceased. 
Respondents1 attack upon the Utah State Bar Committee proceeding 
is also inappropriate. The Utah Supreme Court has approved the 
procedure utilized by the Bar Commission in screening complaints 
against members. Respondents had full and ample opportunity to present 
witnesses and argue their contentions before the Bar Committee 
regarding Sampson's alleged unethical conduct. The fact that the Bar 
Committee failed to find sufficient allegations to go to a full 
adversarial proceeding does not eliminate the "probative value" of the 
Committee's conclusion that insufficient evidence of serious misconduct 
was present justifying such a hearing. This Committee report is 
certainly collateral evidence supporting the lower court's finding that 
no punitive damages were justified under the circumstances of this 
case. 
Finally, the discussion by Respondents concerning the "inadequate 
transcript" (Respondents' Brief, pp. 5-6) is discussed in several 
other portions of Respondents' Brief and will be addressed in 
Appellant's Reply Brief herein. As to the procedural events concerning 
this claim of inadequate transcript, it should be observed that on two 
separate occasions September 18, 1987 and January 12, 1988 Respondents 
filed with the Utah Supreme Court motions to dismiss the appeal and for 
summary affirmance based upon the same contention of an inadequate 
transcript. In all instances the Utah Supreme Court denied 
Respondents' motions and subsequently transferred this appeal to this 
-2-
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Sampson does not contest the facts contained in 
Respondents1 "Statement of Facts" (Respondents1 Brief, p. 6-23) since 
the actual events which occurred are essentially undisputed. 
Appellant, however, does not necessarily agree with the 
characterization of these facts by Respondents or with the titles used 
by Respondents in their various subdivisions. Because of the extensive 
findings by the lower court it would conceivably be possible to write 
several completely different versions of the facts by highlighting 
those areas of concern to the writer. In this appeal, however, the 
only facts which are relevant concern those which support the 
conclusions and judgment of the lower court and any other facts not 
pertaining to this question are extraneous and irrelevant. 
Finally, it should be noted that all record references in the 
"Statement of Facts" of Respondents relate to the Findings and 
Conclusions of the lower court. Respondents have made no attempt to 
cite the underlying transcript upon which the Findings and Conclusions 
of the lower court are based. Thus, Respondents are relying upon the 
Findings and Conclusions of the lower court and not upon the testimony 
of the witnesses at trial. This reliance upon the lower court's 
findings supports Appellant's position that the actual record in this 
case is unnecessary in view of the issues presently raised on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAILURE OF SAMPSON TO INCLUDE THE ENTIRE 
TRIAL TESTIMONY DOES NOT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE 
FOR THIS COURT TO MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE 
JUDGMENT. 
-3-
Respondents contend, as they did in their various motions before 
the Utah Supreme Court, that the failure of Sampson to designate the 
entire trial testimony eliminates the ability of Sampson to now appeal 
the judgment entered against him. (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 26-33). 
Respondents also contend that under the standards of review applicable 
to this appeal the judgment cannot be reversed. (Respondents' Brief, 
pp. 33-35). Both of these arguments are without merit. 
Sampson readily agrees that the arguments now advanced by 
Respondents would be correct if the context of this appeal were 
different. If, for example, Sampson was contesting the factual 
findings of the lower court on the basis that insufficient evidence 
existed to justify such finding Respondents' argument would be germane. 
In the Smith v. Vuicich case cited by Respondents (Respondents' Brief, 
p. 27) the appellant was arguing that the jury verdict was based upon 
insufficient evidence. Obviously, without a full and complete record 
the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be addressed by either the 
complaining party or an appellate court. 
The other decisions cited by Respondents (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
27-29) all deal with an attack upon the sufficiency of evidence in one 
form or another. In all of these cases it is incumbent upon an 
appellant to include the entire record for review since to selectively 
exclude portions of the record eliminates any argument the appellant 
can make that there is no evidence to support the lower court's 
decision. 
Respondents seemingly do not understand the difference between an 
attack upon a finding of fact based upon sufficiency of evidence as 
opposed to a conclusion of law based upon an inadequate factual basis. 
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In this appeal, Appellant Sampson is not attacking the accuracy of the 
lower court's Findings of Fact as to the events and transactions which 
occurred in this litigation. Rather, Sampson is attacking the 
conclusions drawn by the lower court based upon those facts. 
To illustrate this distinction the following example is offered. 
Assume that a traffic accident has occurred and that a trial is held in 
the lower court. During the court proceeding five witnesses testify 
that driver "X" ran a red light whereas one witness testifies that 
driver "Y" ran the red light. The court enters a specific finding that 
Driver MY" ran the red light and that driver "X" did not run the red 
light. On appeal, driver "Y" would contend that the factual finding of 
the lower court was not supported by substantial evidence in that five 
of the witnesses were completely to the contrary. He would have to 
contend that the only witness in support of driver "X" was not capable 
of belief and should have been ignored by the lower court. In a case 
such as this it would be essential to have all the testimony relating 
to all the witnesses and their observations of the light. The holdings 
of the various decisions cited by Respondent are applicable to this 
type of situation. 
As to the instant case, however, a different situation occurs. 
Assume in the previous example that all of the witnesses agree that 
driver "X" ran the red light and that driver "Y" did not run the red 
light. The court enters a specific factual finding to this effect. 
The court then concludes, however, that driver "Y" is negligent and 
that driver "X" is not negligent. On appeal, driver "Y" is merely 
claiming that even though the facts are not disputed and that the lower 
court has correctly interpreted the facts based upon the evidence, the 
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legal conclusion reached from those facts is erroneous. It is not 
necessary to cite the testimony of the various witnesses since there is 
no disagreement as to what factually occurred. The only question on 
appeal is what the court concluded based upon the undisputed facts. 
This last example is applicable to the instant case. After 
reviewing the transcript and the numerous documents in this file 
Appellantfs counsel has concluded that the lower court properly found 
the sequential facts which occurred in this case but incorrectly made 
legal conclusions based upon those facts. It is therefore unnecessary 
to have the supporting record in this case. In other instances, the 
court made its legal conclusions without sufficient findings to support 
them. The failure to have sufficient findings negates the validity of 
the legal conclusions and again the record is not required. 
Several cases from Utah and other jurisdictions are helpful in 
understanding these distinctions. In Ierulli v. Lutz Development Co., 
698 P.2d 504 (Or. App. 1985) a case was appealed concerning the 
validity of the findings and conclusions of the lower court even though 
no record at all was filed with the Court of Appeals. The court there 
noted that findings of fact can be inadquate in three situations. 
First, when they are not supported by any competent, substantial 
evidence; second, when they are unresponsive to or outside the issues 
framed by the pleadings; and third, when they do not support the 
conclusions of law on which judgment is based. The court noted that in 
the first two instances it was unable to review any contentions without 
a record but as to the third type of instance, such review was possible 
since the record was not required. 
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also succinctly stated the 
-6-
principles regarding conclusions of law and factual findings when it 
said: 
A "conclusion of law" is a decision of the court 
stemming from the ultimate factual issues which 
determine the result of the dispute in a non-jury 
trial. A conclusion of law must find support in the 
findings of fact. Ultimate facts are the facts which 
are necessary to determine the issues in the case, as 
distinguished from the evidentiary facts supporting 
them. The lower court's conclusions of law must find 
support in the court's findings in order to be 
sustained on appeal. Romero v. J.W. Jones 
Construction Co., 651 P.2d 1302 (N.M. App. 1982). 
(Emphasis added). 
As Respondents note in their Brief (Respondents' Brief, p. 33) 
when attacking the sufficiency of the evidence it is necessary to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding 
and then demonstrate that even reviewing that evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Hansen v. 
Stewart, 87 Utah Adv. Rpt. 46 (July 28, 1988). 
In the Scharf decision the court noted the distinction between 
marshalling of facts when the sufficiency of evidence is being 
questioned as opposed to attacking a conclusion of law. The court 
stated: 
We next consider Erickson's claim that the trial 
court erred in its conclusions of law. The standard of 
review differs from that applicable to factual 
findings; we accord conclusions of law no particular 
deference, but review them for correctness. 700 P.2d 
at 1070. 
In that decision one of the questions of law was whether a 
.particular sale was commercially reasonable. In affirming the lower 
court's decision the Supreme Court stated, "The facts found by the 
trial court provide ample support for the legal conclusion that the 
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sale was commercially reasonable." Id. at 10.71. 
In the instant case the same type of question exists; namely, 
whether the actions of Sampson constituted an improper means or was for 
an improper purpose and that such actions or purpose was the proximate 
cause of any damages suffered by Respondents. The conclusions of the 
lower court in finding damages against Sampson for tortiously 
interferring with contract can only be sustained if the legal 
conclusions upon which such judgment is based are also supported by the 
factual findings of the lower court. With this issue in focus it is 
not required that the entire record be presented to this Court for 
review since Appellant accepts for the purposes of this appeal all of 
the underlying factual findings by the lower court as true but 
disagrees with the conclusions and characterizations given to these 
findings by the lower court. 
Sampson takes exception, therefore, to the statement by the 
respondents that Sampson is attempting to "sanitize" the evidence by 
only selecting that favorable to Sampson's position. (Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 30-31). Since the lower court in rendering its extensive 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based such Findings and 
Conclusions upon the entire record no such sanitizing has occurred. 
The lower court effectively took into account all of the testimony 
introduced by Respondents when the court rendered its opinion. 
Next, the Respondents heavily rely upon the statement made by 
Sampson's counsel before a Utah Supreme Court hearing that the record 
*as totally inadequate to challenge a judgment at the time a request to 
supplement the record was being made. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 6, 
30-31). The reliance upon this statement, however, is greatly 
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misplaced. At the time the motions occurred before the Utah Supeme 
Court Appellant's counsel had not had the opportunity to review either 
the exhibits or the transcripts of the case. He assumed that all 
avenues of appeal should be left open including a claim of sufficiency 
of evidence. Naturally, under that situation Appellant attempted to 
supplement the designation of record since it had been prepared by the 
court reporter and had already been filed with the Clerk of the Sureme 
Court. 
After the motion was denied Appellant's counsel then reviewed the 
record and exhibits. After such review it was decided that even had 
the entire record been preserved for review that a sufficiency of 
evidence claim would not have been made since the factual Findings of 
operative facts made by the lower court were essentially all correct 
and that because of the high standard of review in sufficiency of 
evidence cases such an effort would have been fruitless. Thus, the 
fact that the present record is totally inadequate to challenge the 
judgment on the sufficiency of evidence grounds is not of any 
consequence to the issues now being raised in this appeal relating to 
Conclusions of Law and characterizations of facts made by the lower 
court. 
The filing of the cross appeal by Respondents has also complicated 
the arguments now being advanced by them. While Respondents are 
adamant that the failure to have a complete record eliminates the 
possibility of review as to Sampson's claim (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
26-35), they make no attempt to justify the ability of this Court to 
review the cross appeal in which, under the theory advanced by 
Respondents, a full record is also required. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
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57-71). 
Several events which occurred during the proceedings of this case 
can also be cited against the respondents. On November 28, 1986 
Respondents filed the following Certificate regarding the record. They 
stated: 
Appellants [Respondents under the present case] 
above-named, through their counsel, hereby certify 
pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, that they do not intend to rely on any 
transcript of the proceedings other than those, if any, 
requested by Respondent [Sampson] in this case or by 
Appellants [Sampson] in related appeal No. 86-0565. 
Respondents, therefore, made no effort to supplement the designation of 
record made by Sampson and are therefore essentially stuck with the 
designation, whether it be good or bad, as it now stands. 
On October 5, 1987 a hearing was held before the Utah Supreme 
Court on Sampson's motion to supplement the record. At that time 
Justice Stewart specifically asked Respondents1 counsel whether the 
additional record would be necessary for Respondents to properly 
present their cross appeal. Respondents1 counsel stated that it would 
not be required since Respondents were relying entirely upon the 
findings of the lower court and not upon the record. 
The present cross appeal is arguing that the lower court failed to 
award damages to the respondents based upon the evidence adduced at 
trial. If, as Respondents argue in the first portion of their brief, a 
party is precluded from relying upon the findings of the lower court 
without having the entire record available then none of the arguments 
advanced by the respondents on their cross appeal can be presented to 
this Court. 
Thus, Respondents are in the horns of a dilemma. Either the 
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record is insufficient for both the appellant and the respondents to 
argue any of the issues now before this Court or, in the alternative, 
the record is sufficient and both sides are entitled to argue upon the 
designated record and upon the Findings and Conclusions entered by the 
lower court. Respondents cannot seek to eliminate the appeal of 
Sampson while at the same time pursuing their own appeal when both 
appeals are based upon the same premises. 
With this explanation of the procedural context of this appeal it 
now remains to examine the merits of the substantive arguments advanced 
by Sampson. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING SAMPSON HAD 
INTENTIONALLY INTERFERRED WITH THE BUSINESS 
RELATIONSHIPS OF DEFENDANTS. 
A. There Was No Factual Finding Sufficient 
to Justify the Conclusion that Sampson Had 
An Improper Purpose in His Dealings With 
The Limited Partnerships. 
Appellant in his opening brief discussed the standard to be 
applied in determining an "improper purpose" under the Supreme Court's 
decision of Leigh Furniture and Carpet. (Appellant's Opening Brief, 
pp. 30-34). Sampson contended that the legal conclusion of improper 
motive reached by the lower court was not supported by the actual 
factual findings of the transaction. 
Respondents counter by arguing that the incomplete record in the 
appeal precludes Sampson from demonstrating that the factual findings 
were erroneous and that the existing record supports the conclusion. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 42-43). 
The present appeal is somewhat unusual in that most cases involve 
claims that the lower court entered insufficient findings or inadequate 
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findings based upon the record. In the instant case, however, the 
court has entered an abundance of findings many of which would be 
leemed evidentiary findings as opposed to findings of ultimate facts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "findings should be limited to 
the ultimate facts." Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1977). 
"Ultimate facts are the facts which are necessary to determine the 
issues in the case, as distinguished from the evidentiary facts 
supporting them." Galvan v. Miller, 445 P.2d 961 (N.M. 1968). 
Thus, in the instant case not only did the lower court enter a 
lumber of ultimate facts but also entered a large number of evidentiary 
facts thereby making it more difficult to sort and sift the relevant 
inquiry. In any event, however, both these evidentiary facts and 
ultimate facts found by the lower court show that Sampson was involved 
in a commercial battle both for himself and for his clients for the 
protection of assets and to preserve the limited partnerships. As 
noted in the Leigh Furniture and Carpet case an improper purpose can 
only be found "where it can be shown that the actor's predominant 
purpose was to injure the plaintiff." 657 P.2d at 307. 
In rejecting a finding of improper purpose in the Leigh Furniture 
case the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
As noted earlier, there is substantial evidence 
that the Leigh corporation deliberately injured Isom's 
economic relations. But that injury was not an end in 
itself. It was an intermediate step toward achieving 
the long-range financial goal of profitably reselling 
the building free of Isom's interest. Because that 
economic interest seems to have been controlling, we 
must conclude that the evidence in this case would not 
support a jury finding that the corporation's 
predominant purpose was to injure or ruin Isom's 
business merely for the sake of injury alone. Id. at 
308. (Emphasis added). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that even if it is assumed 
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arguendo that Sampson had a vendetta to oust Richins and to take 
complete control of the limited partnerships that such purpose was no. 
different than that in the Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co, case which 
the Utah Supreme Court found was not improper. For this reason, 
therefore, the lower court erred in concluding that Sampson's efforts 
could be classified as a "improper purpose" under the tort of 
interference with contract. 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Concluding 
That Sampson Utilized Improper Means 
During His Relationship With the Limited 
Partnerships. 
Sampson in his opening brief contended that the lower court also 
erred in categorizing his conduct as an improper means. (Appellant's 
opening Brief, pp. 34-40). Respondents replied to this argument in 
their brief. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 35-41). Respondents have, 
however, both misinterpreted the legal standards and the facts of this 
case in making their retort. 
The Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture stated that to recover 
damages under the common-law cause of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations the plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant intentionally interferred with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by an 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 657 P.2d at 304. 
Respondents have confused the element of improper means with the 
element of intentional interference. In Respondents' brief they state 
that six acts of the defendants in the Leigh Furniture case constituted 
the "improper means of interference". (Respondents' Brief, p. 36). 
They then quote from page 306 of the opinion in which the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the cumulative effect of these various acts resulted 
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in interference. (Respondents1 Brief, p. 37). 
If the Leigh Furniture case is examined, however, it is seen that 
the quotation upon which Respondents rely deals with the question as to 
the first element of whether the defendants intentionally interferred 
with the plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations. 
Subdivision (c) of the opinion beginning on page 305 is entitled 
"Evidence of Intentional Interference and Causation". The discussion 
relied upon by the respondents, therefore, only goes to the issue as to 
whether conduct occurred which caused interference with a business 
relationship. The court's discussion as to "improper means" does not 
occur until some three pages later. (Id. at 308-11). 
Appellant Sampson readily admits that the actions which occurred 
during this transaction satisfied the first element of the test in that 
he intentionally interferred with the respondents1 existing or 
potential economic relations. All of the actions which are listed in 
Respondents1 brief either directly or indirectly had some effect upon 
the economic relations of Respondents. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
38-40). 
The lower court listed nine acts which it believed constituted 
improper means as defined in the Leigh Furniture case. (See, 
Appellant's opening Brief, pp. 34-35). Respondents have expanded this 
list to some 22 acts. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 37-40). Sampson would 
submit that the lower court's own characterization of the improper acts 
should be controlling since the lower court did not necessarily have to 
believe that every alleged wrong of Sampson constituted an improper 
means. However, even if it is assumed arguendo that all of the acts 
listed by the respondents constituted the improper means in this case 
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they are still insufficient to qualify under the Leigh Furniture 
criteria. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined improper means as follows: 
The alternative requirement of improper means is 
satisfied where the means used to interfer with a 
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in 
themselves and hence are clearly "improper" means of 
interference. . . . "Commonly included among improper 
means are violence, threats or other intimidation, 
deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded 
litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." 
Means may also be improper or wrongful because they 
violate "an established standard of a trade or 
profession." Id. at 308 (Citations omitted). 
In addition, the Supreme Court also stated that the absence of 
"good faith" is another element to consider when evaluating the conduct 
of a party. The decision of the Utah Supreme Court utilizing the 
concept of good faith is in accordance with the numerous authorities 
cited by Appellant in his opening brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 
36-39). Respondents' attempt to answer the good faith argument 
advanced by Sampson by stating that (1) good faith is not applicable to 
a cumulative number of acts; (2) "the district court did in fact make 
several references to Sampson's supposed absence of malice in arriving 
at its conclusion that Sampson used a series of improper means to take 
control of the limited partnerships;" (3) that "good faith" is nothing 
more than a claim of legal privilege which was not pled." (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 41). 
As to these contentions Respondents cited no authority to the 
effect that good faith should not be examined as to each alleged act 
regardless of the number of acts supposedly constituting an improper 
means. The second grounds alleged by Respondents is totally 
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incomprehensible by Appellant in that it would seem to support 
Sampson's position that he had no malice in his actions- Finally, the 
element of "good faith" is not the same as the affirmative defense of 
privilege which is an affirmative defense once the acts charged would 
be tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant. 657 P.2d at 304. 
It is the burden of the asserting party to show that the alleged 
tortfeasor acted in bad faith and in a malicious manner. 
(Institutional Food v. Golden State Strawberries, 587 F. Supp. 1105 
(D.Mo. 1983). 
Examining those reasons given by the lower court for concluding an 
improper means existed (see, Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35) and even 
examining the expanded list of the respondents (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
37-40) shows that the alleged violations were either (1) not sufficient 
conduct to constitute an improper means as defined in the Leigh 
Furniture case; (2) actions which had no direct causal interference 
with the economic relations of the respondents; or (3) actions which 
were undertaken in good faith for the protection of Sampson's clients 
and investors. In fact, if this Court examines the claims of 
Respondents as to the alleged improper acts it will find that the 
majority of them occurred during various legal proceedings in which 
Sampson, as found by the lower court, sincerely believed he had the 
right to do what he was doing and had court approval to do so. 
Thus, Respondents' assertions that the conduct in the Leigh 
Furniture case is parallel to that of the instant case is an incorrect 
statement. In Leigh there was a clear and consistent pattern on the 
part of the defendant to eliminate the business of the plaintiff for no 
other reason than to gain back the building for its own economic use. 
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In the instant case, quite the contrary, the respondents had already 
placed the assets of the limited partnerships in serious jeopardy and 
Sampson along with others was attempting to salvage the operations 
before any further catastrophies occurred. In addition, the 
respondents had clearly bowed out of the fracas by giving notices of 
withdrawal and by essentially telling the limited partners that they 
were on their own. 
These circumstances as factually found by the lower court do not 
give rise to the legal conclusion that Sampson exercised improper means 
in attempting to salvage the limited partnership. If Sampson's actions 
are deemed improper then essentially every stockholder takeover or 
attempted merger of a corporation would also be called improper because 
of the adversarial relation which two competitors place themselves in 
while attempting to garner the support of shareholders or other voting 
members. In addition, if any court proceeding is later determined to 
be invalid or any action declared invalid when based upon a sincere 
good faith belief of statutory authority then literally hundreds of 
thousands of acts dealing with corporations and other businesses each 
year would also be deemed predatory. Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court 
and other courts in the country before permitting a plaintiff to 
recover under the theory of tortious interference require a much 
greater showing than the battles of the marketplace. Here, the lower 
court clearly erred in concluding to the contrary. 
C. The Lower Court Erred in Concluding 
That the Actions of Sampson Caused 
Injury to the Defendants. 
In Sampson's opening brief he contended that the finding of the 
lower court of causal injury was incorrect because of two factors: (1) 
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that the contracts were terminable at will and (2) defendants failed to 
show that but for Sampson's interference the ventures would have been 
successful. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 40-44). Respondents argue that 
Sampson's conduct was a substantial factor in causing injury to the 
respondents and that therefore the doctrine of concurrent negligence is 
applicable (Respondents' Brief, pp. 43-45); and second, even if 
application of the "but for" test is required Sampson's conduct was the 
proximate cause of injury to the defendants. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
45-49). The arguments of Respondents are flawed with illogical and 
factual deficiencies. 
First, Respondents contend that the lower court concluded that it 
was a combination of both the conduct of Respondents and Sampson which 
caused the damages in this lawsuit. Respondents then argue that both 
parties were the concurrent causes of the complained injuries and 
therefore under the doctrine of concurrent negligence Sampson is solely 
liable for the injuries suffered. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 44-45). 
Effectively, therefore, Respondents are conceding that their 
mismanagement and other actions were an equal force in the demise of 
the various limited partnerships. If a third party were suing both 
Richins and Sampson then the concurrent negligence rule cited by 
Respondents would be applicable since it is fundamental that where the 
separate negligent acts of two defendants concur and it appears that 
the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the concurrence of 
both then both defendants are jointly liable. However, this is not a 
case of concurrent liability as beween the parties and a third innocent 
party but is a case between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Thus, 
the doctrine of comparative negligence under Utah law would be 
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applicable in apportioning the degree of fault by each of the parties 
in this lawsuit. (Section 78-27-37, et. seg. supp. 1986). See, 
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) (comparative 
negligence becomes a defense for a defendant where plaintiff's 
negligent conduct is a contributing factor in causing injury). 
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence if, as Respondents 
contend, the actions of Sampson and Respondents were concurrent causes 
of the complained-of injuries then neither party could recover from the 
other for injuries suffered. Section 78-27-38, U.C.A. It is therefore 
unnecessary under the very arguments advanced by Respondents to examine 
the conduct of Sampson individually in that the concurrent fault of 
both parties would preclude the damages now awarded. 
The respondents also address the "but for" argument raised in 
Appellant's opening brief. They apparently do not contest the legal 
authority cited by Appellant. Instead, Respondents contend that the 
terminable nature of the contracts and the financial condition of the 
limited partnerships when Sampson entered the scene are insufficient 
reasons to eliminate the causal connection which the lower court found. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 46-47). 
Sampson after reviewing the Restatement of Torts section cited by 
Respondents agrees that the issue of "at will" termination is normally 
one properly of damages rather than causation. However, the very 
flimsy nature of the limited partnerships belie any claim by 
Respondents that all of the limited pastners would have stayed with 
Richins bur for Sampson. Thus, the terminable nature of these 
agreements affects both proximate causation and damages. 
The second argument raised by Respondents concerns the financial 
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stability of the partnership at the time Sampson undertook his initial 
representation. Respondents state, "Even charitably assuming for 
purposes of argument that the limited partnerships were in fact 
suffering from 'financial instability1 on the date Sampson first 
appeared on the scene" the limited partnerships had been "solvent, 
viable entities for over seven years by the time Sampson first began 
tampering with their affairs." (Respondents1 Brief, p. 47). 
The statement of the respondents is not supported by the record 
references given in their brief nor is it supported by the factual 
findings upon which they now rely. There can be no question but that 
at the time Sampson first entered the fracas the limited partnerships 
were all in serious financial difficulty. A brief review of some of 
the findings and conclusions of the lower court shows this financial 
instability. 
[T]he existing problems began to surface in May, 
1980, [when] some limited partners began to lose trust 
and confidence in Richins to the point that those 
limited partnership who were still actively concerned 
about their investments refused to pay over to Richins 
any further funds either on past or current assessments 
and began to consider the need to seek the advice of 
counsel with respect to their various partnership 
interests. (R. 2103) 
On June 22, 1979 Richins was advised by attorney 
Baker for Agricultural Services that notice of 
non-payment on installment contracts due on irrigation 
contracts for Shoshone, Randlett, and Young at the 
Idaho State Bank had been issued. . . . (R. 2104). 
On September 12, 1979 notice was given that a 
$300,000 loan by Utah Mortgage to RFC and assigned to 
Northwest National Life and guaranteed by Paul and 
Shari Richins was in default and if payments were not 
made in full by September 25, a foreclosure proceeding 
would be started. (R. 2105). 
On November 20, 1979 two lien claims were filed by 
the Sages against Shoshone, RFC and Richins for over 
$30,000 which had gone to judgments later. (Id.). 
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At a Taber Partnership meeting on April 3, 1980, 
it was reported that some RFC checks to PCA had been 
returned for insufficient funds. (R. 2106). 
Two judgment liens were made of record, one on 
August 17, 1979 by Rex Clemmons for $2,340 and one on 
October 5, 1979 by Lemon White Drilling for $3,264. 
(Id.). 
At the May 29, 1980 meeting the evidence 
established that mention was made that the $17,600 
payment due Glenn in September, 1979, had not been 
paid; that from $30,000 to $50,000 would be needed to 
complete the Minter-Wilson wells; that a total of 
$240,000 was needed to meet current Catlow Valley 
obligations and that as Richins did not have such 
money, the limited partners were the only source for 
it. . . . (R. 2107). 
Dissatisfaction of Richins1 handling of the 
partnership affairs was voiced in May, 1980. This 
coupled with other problems extant in 1980, including a 
lack of meaningful information from the general 
partner, the existence of judgments, troublesome tax 
problems, the state securities commission's 
investigations, the revocation of RFC's certificate of 
authority in Oregon, the failure of many limited 
partners to pay their assessments and Richins1 failure 
to do anything about it, and Richins' invitation to the 
Catlow Valley partners at the May 29, 1980 meeting to 
replace him, all added up to a compelling reason for 
the partnerships to so act as provided in the 
agreement. (R. 2116-17). 
As stated in prior findings, by May, 1980, Richins 
and his companies had become confronted with 
substantial financial problems, as well as others 
likewise mentioned elsewhere, which were of such 
magnitude that success in overcoming them seemed 
doubtful. (R. 2141-42). 
I do not find that the evidence preponderates 
proving that, but for Sampson's statements to the 
investors that such advances were not debts owed to the 
partners, the partnerships would have in fact repaid 
the amount of such advances in full as shown in the 
partnership books and records, or indeed any part 
thereof. (R. 2149). 
The record in summary thus shows that in May, 
1980, Richins and his companies had control of at least 
25 limited farm partnerships with assets and 
liabilities of such a nature that they had serious 
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financial problems in May, 1980, when Sampson first 
became involved, (R. 2158). 
By May, 1980, Richins had so mismanaged 
partnership affairs that they did not have funds to pay 
installments owed to RFC, so RFC could not pay its 
installment obligations to the contract sellers. 
Substantial judgments were obtained for failure to pay 
partnership obligations. Some partners were angry 
because of Richins1 failure to follow the partnership 
agreements upon assessment and failure to pay; to give 
an annual audited report to each; to have the 
properties appraised by a qualified appraiser and give 
the partners a report on the value of their holdings, 
to advise them regarding advances and obligations with 
respect thereto; and to keep them advised of the 
problems that develop- (R. 2273). 
With the preceding examples together with those noted in 
Appellant's opening brief it is difficult to understand how Respondents 
can claim that the limited partnerships had been "solvent, viable 
entities until Sampson first began tampering with their affairs," 
Likewise, Respondents' statement that while the properties were 
under the supervision of the Richtron companies that none of them were 
ever foreclosed upon is equally unsupported by the record. To the 
contrary, the findings cited by Respondents show that the lower court 
had no evidence submitted by either party as to the specifics of the 
foreclosures. The court stated on several occasions that it had no way 
of knowing the disposition of the properties or the status of the funds 
received from such property. (R. 2128-29, 2228). In addition, since 
the respondents immediately attempted to "bail out" almost as soon as 
Sampson entered the picture the fact that Sampson could not salvage the 
dilapidated condition of these partnerships cannot be attributed solely 
to Sampson's conduct. Essentially, therefore, the evidence as to 
foreclosures proves nothing as to either party. 
Next, Respondents contend that it was solely the conduct of 
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Sampson which prevented the limited partners from paying their pro rata 
proportion of expenses. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 47-48). Sampson 
would refer this Court to the previous quotations above relating to 
Richins' failure to obtain contributions in 1979 and 1980. In 
addition, the lower court specifically found that the erroneous 
statements of Sampson concerning mark-ups and other claims had no 
effect upon the payment by the limited partners. The court stated: 
I do not find that the evidence preponderates in 
proving that, but for Sampson's statements to the 
investors that such advances were not debts owed to the 
partners, the partnerships would have in fact repaid 
the amount of such advances in full as shown in the 
partnership books and records, or indeed any part 
thereof. (R. 2149). 
Respondents1 statement concerning the "long standing viability of the 
limited partnerships and their ability to obtain all required operating 
capital from the investors" is again a complete misstatement of the 
findings of the lower court. 
Respondents argue that because a settlement agreement has been 
tentatively reached in May of 1980 for $700,000 it is a reasonable 
inference that the going concern value of the limited partnership was 
substantial. (Respondents' Brief, p. 48). Had the respondents 
gracefully bowed out in May of 1980 and allowed Sampson to operate the 
partnerships without interference, then the argument made by 
Respondents would have some relevance. However, Respondents continued 
to engage in a virtual four-year proxy battle with Sampson thereby 
destroying any inherent value that a peaceful take-over would have had. 
It can be just as easily said that had the respondents not interferred 
with Sampson's management and efforts to revitalize the faltering 
partnerships, that the operation would have been successful and all of 
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the parties would have come out ahead. Instead, however, the battle 
raging between the two entities continued to drain each of their 
resources together with being their ability to confront all of the 
problems facing the partnerships prior to Sampson's arrival. It cannot 
be said with the legal certainty required that the actions of Sampson 
caused the financial demise of these partnerships in 1986 after the 
opposition of Respondents during the prior five-year period. 
Finally, Respondents contend that the quotations in Sampson's 
opening brief only referred to damages inflicted upon Richtron 
Financial and not to the other entities. (Respondents' Brief, p. 49). 
Again, this statement is entirely incorrect since the court in those 
findings (listed on pages 40 and 41 of Appellant's Brief) was speaking 
both in terms of RFC, the general partners, and Richins as an 
individual. In addition, the other quotations made in this Brief 
clearly address all of the individual Respondents and their unstable 
financial condition. 
It is impossible to read the findings of the lower court and to 
then agree with the concluding statement of Respondents that "the 
record establishes that but for Sampson's seizure of the limited 
partnerships, the Richtron companies would have obtained the various 
economic benefits embodied by the limited partnership agreements." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 49). Further discussion as to this 
misstatement is not required. 
D. The Lower Court Erred in Concluding 
that the Affirmative Defenses of Waiver 
and Estoppel were not Applicable to the 
Defendants in this Case. 
Appellant in his opening brief contended that the lower court 
failed to legally conclude that the affirmative defenses of waiver and 
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estoppel had been established. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-47). 
Respondents simply retorted that Sampson had failed to marshall all 
evidence relevant to the findings and therefore appellate review cannot 
be undertaken. (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 49-50). 
Again, Respondents are mistaken as to their notion of the 
"marshalling of evidence" rule. Sampson is not contesting any factual 
finding as to what occurred in this case but is contesting the legal 
conclusion based upon such findings. It is Sampson's belief that the 
factual findings entered by the court as to the conduct of the 
respondents clearly justifies a legal conclusion of waiver and 
estoppel. 
It would serve no useful purpose of marshall additional evidence 
of factual support for these defenses since the lower court's factual 
findings have adequately provided a sufficient foundation for legal 
review. The very effort of the respondents to continuously withdraw 
from the partnership arrangement is the very type of factual context 
that these legal doctrines are based upon. As observed by the lower 
court "one wonders what Richins thought the partnerships were expected 
to do. The Richtron general partners' withdrawal had left them with an 
uncertain future." (R. 2186). 
Since Respondents have failed to address these factual arguments 
further discussion is unnecessary. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
A. The Factual Findings of the Lower 
Court do not Justify the Imposition 
of $250,000 as Consequential Damages. 
Appellant in his opening brief contended that the findings of the 
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lower court do not justify the imposition of a $250,000 award of 
damages. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 47-54). Respondents contend that 
damages were proper because (1) the absence of the complete trial 
record is fatal to Sampson's challenge of damages and (2) the award is 
consistent with applicable law and abundantly supported by the existing 
record on appeal. Both of these arguments will now be addressed. 
Sampson is solely relying upon the findings of the lower court for 
his assertion that the factual findings do not justify the legal 
conclusion of $250,000 damages. While the factual findings of the 
lower court are necessarily based upon the evidence which was 
introduced at trial, it is not the contention of Sampson that a review 
of such evidence is now required. Thus, any attempt by Respondents to 
convert this appeal to a sufficiency of evidence case is a fruitless 
venture. 
This is not the type of case in which an award of a fixed sum of 
damages is being appealed as to the insufficiency of the supporting 
record. For example, if a trial court awarded a plaintiff $40,000 for 
loss of wages the defendant could claim that the evidence adduced at 
trial did not support the $40,000 award. In such an instance the 
complete record would be imperative for appellate review. 
The present appeal is analogous to a situation in which the lower 
court awards $40,000 for lost wages in its judgment and conclusions of 
law with no factual findings to support such judgment that any lost 
wages occurred or any factual finding as to how such wages were 
computed. In these type of instances the underlying record is not 
required since only the factual findings and conclusions of law and 
judgment are needed for review. State v. Deplonty, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 
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1987). Thus, the "marshalling of evidence" argument again advanced by 
Respondents is not applicable to Appellant's present claim. 
Next, Respondents argue that the award of consequential damages is 
consistent with applicable law. (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 52-54). 
Respondents do not address the problem raised initially by Appellant 
that the lower court simply failed to give any factual road map as to 
the composition of the $250,000 award. It is elementary that the 
findings of fact of a lower court must provide a basis for determining 
whether there is a rational basis for the award of damages. Proper 
findings are essential to enable a reviewing court to perform its 
function of assuring that the findings support the judgment. Romrell 
v. Zions Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court in describing the requirement of findings 
stated: 
The importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge 
is essential to the resolution of dispute under the 
proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusions on each factual issue was reached. Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
More recently the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court finds facts 
specially in all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the 
"mind of the court," and must resolve all issues of 
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of 
law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, failure 
of a trial court to enter adequate findings requires 
the judgment to be vacated. Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1983). 
It is submitted that the lower court in this case failed to follow 
this requirement. It is pure speculation on the part of Respondents 
that the $250,000 consisted of money which was left in the bank account 
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of Sampson after October 29, 1984. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 54-56). 
In the first place, if this in fact were the measure of damages it 
would be $288,597 and not the even figure of $250,000. Second, while 
the final accounting may have occurred on October 29, 1984 it was not 
until January 5, 1985 that Richins obtained an order from Judge Cornaby 
vacating his two prior orders which gave Sampson the right to control 
the partnership. (R. 2185). Thus, if any date was to have any 
relevance at all when Sampson ceased having legal authority to operate 
the corporation it would have been the January date to which no 
evidence was ever offered. 
Next, the lower court specifically rejected Respondents' 
contention that Sampson "and twelve people" ended up with all of the 
assets of the limited partnerships. The court stated: 
[N]o evidence was placed in the record 
establishing that such was in fact the case, but if so, 
absent any such evidence, I cannot consider this 
statement [closing argument of Respondents' counsel] as 
a factor upon which this decision can be made. I have 
repeatedly noted the absence of evidence as to what 
finally happened to the partnerships and their 
properties other than a schedule showing only the dates 
upon which foreclosures presumably took place. Id. 
at 2265-2266. 
The court also specifically denied Respondents' claim for an 
accounting and while the court noted that the record contained no 
evidence as to what happened to the partnerships and their properties 
the court would not allow such curiosity to further prolong a decision 
in this case. (R. 2277). Thus, the lower court was obviously not 
convinced that whatever money remained in the Sampson accounts in the 
latter part of 1984 and the early part of 1985 was for the benefit of 
Respondents and essentially concluded that all the money had been used 
in one way or another on behalf of the limited partnerships. 
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The explanation given by the Respondents is in direct 
contradiction to that given by the lower court itself in the post-trial 
motions which is contained in the Appendix to the opening brief. 
Certainly, it would have been an easy matter for the lower court to 
have stated the composition of the amount had it been so simple as the 
remaining balance in a bank account on a given date. Instead, the 
court went through its analogy of an automobile tort case and general 
damages obtained from a jury. Such analogy certainly would have not 
been required had the explanation offered by Respondents been the true 
"mind of the court". 
Finally, the award of the sum remaining in the bank accounts would 
be equivalent of conceding that the respondents were entitled to 
receive all of the proceeds and assets gathered by Sampson during his 
operation of the limited partnerships. As is noted by the respondents 
in their cross appeal, the lower court specifically rejected this 
notion and refused to award them damages for the amounts collected and 
disbursed by Sampson during his control of the limited partnerships. 
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 65-68). Thus, the $250,000 figure has no 
basis in the findings of the court. 
Next, Respondents contend that the award of "consequential" 
damages is of a general nature and did not require either the pleading 
or proof previously asserted by Sampson in his opening brief. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 52-54; Respondents1 Brief, pp. 52-53). The 
arguments advanced by Respondents are clearly and unequivocably dead 
wrong. 
The Restatement of Torts 2d §774A uses the term "pecuniary" loss 
and "consequential" loss in defining the liability for damages. 
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Respondents acknowledge that "pecuniary" loss is a special damage. 
This acknowledgement is correct since normally "pecuniary" damages are 
those which can be accurately estimated such as loss of wages, costs of 
medical attendance, etc. whereas "non-pecuniary" damages are those 
which depend on the enlightened judgment of an impartial court or jury 
such as damages for pain, suffering, loss of reputation, etc, 25 
C.J.S. §2 Damages, p. 622. 
Respondents then argue that since pecuniary losses are special 
then consequential losses must necessarily be general. This argument 
is incorrect. "Consequential" damages have been defined as follows: 
Consequential damages are such as are not produced 
without the concurrence of some other event 
attributable to the same origin or cause; such damage, 
loss, or injury as does not flow directly and 
immediately from the act of the party, but only from 
the consequences or results of such act. The term may 
include damage which is so remote as to not be 
actionable. It has also been defined as synonomous 
with the term "special damages". 25 C.J.S. §2 
Damages, p. 617 (Emphasis added). 
Numerous courts have also recognized that "consequential" damages 
are merely a form of special damages which must be proven with 
certainty. In Piedmont Plastics, Inc. v. Mize Co., Inc., 293 S.E.2d 
219 (N.C. App. 1982) the court stated: 
Incidental and consequential damages are "special 
damages," those which do not necessarily result from 
the wrong. Special damages "must be pleaded, and the 
facts giving rise to [them] must be alleged so as to 
fairly inform the defendant of the scope of plaintiff's 
demand." An instruction on special damages is 
appropriate, however, only when such damages are 
particularly alleged in the complaint and the 
allegation is sustained by the evidence. Id. at 223 
(citations omitted). 
See also, Hycel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 190, 
193 (D. Tex. 1971) ("consequential damages are synonymous with 
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special damages"). 
Normally, in order for consequential damages to be awarded it is 
necessary to show that the loss which was incurred was within the 
contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made. 
This requirement has been eliminated by the Restatement of Torts 2d 
provided that the consequential damages were legally caused by the 
defendant's interference. See, §774A, Comment d. The fact that such 
damages do not need to be in contemplation of the parties, however, 
does not change the nature of the damages as special rather than 
general. Clark v. Ferro Corp., 237 F. Supp. 230, 238 (D. Tenn. 
1964); Seekinqs v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 215 (Ariz. 
1982) . 
Thus, in cases involving torts of intentional interference with 
contracts claims made under Subsection (a) and (b) of the Restatement 
of Torts 2d §774A damages must be pled and proved specially since there 
is no provision *for general damages to be awarded in those instances. 
The lower court's characterization of the $250,oOO as equivalent to 
pain and suffering in a jury case was clearly a misconception of the 
law. 
Finally, Sampson has no dispute with the authorities cited by 
Respondents concerning the certainty of damages. (Respondents' Brief, 
p. 54). These cases, however, are completely inapplicable to the 
facts of this case since all of the case cited by Respondents involve 
instances where the fact of special damages had been established but 
the amount of damages was uncertain because of various evidentiary 
problems. Here, neither the court nor the respondents can show what 
consequential damages were being awarded so that the question of 
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computing the amount never comes into play. 
For these reasons, therefore, the award by the lower court of 
$250,000 as consequential damages was incorrect and should be vacated. 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Awarding 
Damages to Richtron, Inc. and to RFC 
for their Respective Limited Partnership 
Interests in Several Farm Properties. 
Sampson in his opening brief maintained that the award of some 
$35,000 to RFC and to Richtron, Inc. for their interest as limited 
partners was erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 54-56). Respondents 
retort that there was some evidentiary basis contained in the findings 
supporting the lower court's conclusion. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
56-57). 
The reply of Respondents does not address the arguments raised by 
Sampson. First, even the evidence relied upon by Respondents only 
concerns a portion of the total $35,&00 award. Second, it was the 
respondents' burden, not Sampson's, to show damages which included 
proof that the value of the limited partnerships was worthless at the 
time of trial and that they had therefore suffered the loss of their 
capital contribution. 
Finally, Respondents do not even address the contention that 
Richins waived any claim he may now have as to the interest of the 
limited partnerships when he failed, as a general partner, to properly 
terminate and wind up the affairs of those interests. Richins should 
not be allowed a preferential treatment over the other limited partners 
involved in this case especially since Richins had the power to 
preserve and protect his interests in these limited partnerships. Had 
Sampson's efforts succeeded and the venture been successful certainly 
these limited pastnerships would have been entitled to no more than the 
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others. 
For these reasons, therefore, the approximate $35,000 award to 
Richins Financial and Richtron, Inc. should be vacated. 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING 
TO IMPOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST SAMPSON. 
In Respondents1 Cross Appeal they contend that the lower court 
erred in failing to award any punitive damages against Sampson. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 57-64). They note that the lower court 
failed to make such award "despite the fact that it identified and 
enumerated dozens of facts establishing Sampson's reckless disregard 
for the rights of the Richins parties." Respondents then list some 
twenty-six such facts and circumstances justifying the imposition of an 
award. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 59-63). 
Before proceeding into the merits of Respondents' arguments a 
procedural note should be made. The Respondents are now arguing that 
the findings of the lower court do not support the legal conclusion of 
punitive damages. Since Respondents did not designate any additional 
portions of the record than those designated by Sampson, the 
respondents must necessarily rely upon the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law for its present contentions concerning not only 
punitive damages but the other damage claims in the remainder of their 
brief. 
Thus, as noted earlier in this brief, Respondents scream loudly 
about the failure of Sampson to designate the entire record and to 
marshall the evidence but in no way attempt to distinguish their claims 
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of damages when an incomplete record also exists. It is submitted, 
therefore, that this is additional proof that the respondents 
themselves do not believe that an underlying record is necessary in 
this case, either as to their own claims or as to the claims of 
Sampson, and that if their contentions are correct then both the appeal 
and the cross appeal must necessarily fail equally in that no logical 
distinction can be made. 
The award of punitive damages is an extraordinary event which 
should only occur in extremely limited situations. "Although punitive 
damages may be awarded in an appropriate case, the general rule is that 
only compensatory damages are appropriate and that punitive damages may 
be awarded only in exceptional cases." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). Punitive damages 
should be imposed cautiously. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 
(Utah 1985). 
"Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, 
errors of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence." 
Restatement (2d) of Torts, §908, Comment b at 465 (1979); C.F. Palombi 
v. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969). In addition, punitive 
damages cannot be awarded for mere breach of contract unless the breach 
amounts to an independent tort. Highland Construction Co. v. Union 
Pacific Railway Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Jorgensen v. John Clay 
& Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
An award of punitive damages cannot stand unless compensatory 
damages are also shown. Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). Punitive damages "are not 
intended as additional compensation to a plaintiff, and must, if 
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awarded, serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring 
outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by 
other means." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 
1186 (Utah 1983). Before punitive damages may be awarded, the 
plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful and malicious, First 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 598 
(Utah 1982); or that manifests and knowing and reckless indifference 
and disregard towards the rights of others. Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982). 
"The jury (or other factfinder) has 'a broad discretion1 in 
weighing the various factors and arriving at its determination of an 
appropriate award of punitive damages." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. 
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (Utah 1982). Punitive damages are not 
properly given against one who acts in good faith under an erroneous 
sense of duty. U.S. Through Farmers Home Administration v. Redland, 
695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985). "One is not liable for exemplary damages 
if he acts in good faith under an erroneous sense of duty or right, 
without any intention to oppress or defraud or without any actual 
oppression or indignity." 22 Am.Jur.2d §778, Damages, p. 831-32. 
It should be observed that in all the cases cited by Respondents 
as well as cases independently researched by Appellant, there have been 
no instances where an appellate court has imposed punitive damages when 
such imposition was initially rejected by the fact finder. Thus, for 
Respondents to prevail in their claim of punitive damages it will be 
necessary for Respondents to convince this Court that the trial judge's 
conclusions of good faith and lack of willful misconduct is not 
supported by the factual findings supporting such conclusions. 
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Appellant Sampson submits that a review of the lower court's decision 
as to punitive damages shows that such conclusions were properly based 
upon an analysis of the events and that the decision of the lower court 
should therefore not be disturbed. 
The lower court in Findings of Fact No, 118 extensively examined 
the factual basis for the award of punitive damages. The court 
examined the various legal rulings which supported Sampson's authority 
as well as the actions of the respondents in abandoning and turning 
over complete control of the entities to Sampson during various periods 
of time. The court entered the following finding to justify its 
conclusion that the type of willful and malicious conduct necessary for 
punitive damages was simply not present in this case. The court 
stated: 
One wonders what Richins thought the partnerships 
were expected to do. The Richtron general partners' 
withdrawal had left them with an undercertain future. 
Many limited partners had sought legal advice from 
Sampson and he gave it to them. The fact that he erred 
in the advice given them does not render his actions 
malicious. They, too, could read and write, and a 
simple sentence in the partnership agreement gave them 
the authority by simple vote to remove the general 
partner, elect a new one and carry on the business of 
the partnerships. Or, they could have petitioned the 
Court to terminate the partnerships and wind up its 
affairs. They did neither. They had Sampson. When 
this case was filed February 11, 1981, Richins could 
have requested a restraining order against Sampson's 
interference with partnership affairs. Instead, no 
doubt influenced by continued settlement negotiations, 
he entered into a stipulation delaying the filing of 
any responsive pleading. An answer and counterclaim 
finally made it to the court in July, 1982. 
The court then made the following comments with reference to Sampson's. 
state of mind: 
By my comments in this Finding it is not my intent 
to point the finger of blame at Richins and exonerate 
Sampson, for I have already made my findings of his 
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wrongdoing, but I think it necessary to view Richins• 
role in judging Sampson's conduct, in considering the 
claim for punitive damages, and in doing so it is my 
opinion that as wrong as Sampson was in many of the 
things he did, I think he believed himself to be right 
in doing what he did and the way he did them. He 
should have known the law, but I do not believe he 
intentionally violated it. For almost six months he 
worked amicably with Richins on settlement. When that 
failed, by powers of attorney he got proxies to vote 
the limited partners1 interests. He did so, electing 
his PC general partner. When that was said to be 
contrary to law, he voted AG Management in as general 
partner and so operated. By the time Judge Palmer 
ruled that illegal, Sampson was able to carry on under 
a color of authority by receipt of an IRS Certificate 
of Sale, followed by two favorable rulings by Judge 
Cornaby until the IRS sale was voided in May, 1984, by 
a federal court order. 
In characterizing the type of conduct in this case the court stated: 
The bitterness and contentions that developed and 
existed between the two men was long and drawn out and 
led to prolonged controversies which had its roots in 
serious problems already existing before Sampson 
entered the ring. But I do not believe the evidence 
preponderates in establishing the type of willful and 
malicious conduct, nor the lessened type, required by 
our Supreme Court decisions to justify or support an 
award of punitive damages and I so find. (R. 
2186-88). (Emphasis added). See also, Conclusion of 
Law No. 76 (R. 2249) . 
The above-quoted Finding of the lower court effectively answers 
the majority of those items now listed by the respondents as 
constituting predatory conduct. The Findings of the court also negates 
Respondents1 contention that Sampsons1 actions showed a knowing and 
reckless indifference and disregard for the rights of others. The 
Findings, to the contrary, shows that while Sampson made many mistakes 
in judgment during the course of these proceedings, he did so in order 
to protect the financial investments of the limited partners and always 
acted in good faith via a court order or other legal badge of 
authority. The contrary positions taken by Respondents throughout this 
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affair hardly gives them the right to complain of Sampson's conduct 
since their conduct was much more recklessly indifferent towards the 
rights of the limited partners when they essentially abandoned them and 
left them to their own devices. 
For these reasons, the decision of the lower court in refusing to 
award punitive damages must affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD RICHTRON, INC. AND RICHTRON GENERAL 
THE FULL AMOUNT COLLECTED AND DISBURSED BY 
SAMPSON DURING HIS CONTROL OF THE LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS. 
On cross appeal, Respondents argue that the lower court should 
have credited to them all of the monies received by Sampson between 
June of 1980 and November of 1982. It is unknown why Respondents have 
chosen this time period for their claim since Sampson continued to 
operate the company well into 1985 and collected much more than the 
$645,000 now requested by Respondents. (R. 2262-67). 
The lower court, as previously mentioned, found that Sampson 
during this entire period of time was acting as a general partner on 
behalf of the limited partners under one legal basis or another and 
that the funds received by Sampson were properly paid on behalf of the 
limited partnership ventures. (R. 2267). Thus, Respondents are now 
demanding that they be given a judgment for the entire proceeds during 
this 28-month period even though they do not contest (nor can they 
contest without the record) the finding of the lower court that such 
funds were properly paid for partnership expenses. 
Respondents also fail to address the problems created by their own 
conduct. It is to be remembered, for example, that Richins formally 
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withdrew as general partner from all of the entities by January 1981. 
(R. 2184). Moreover, Richins consented to Sampson's role in the 
collection of funds and for many months worked with Sampson in their 
attempt to settle the problems surrounding the limited partnerships. 
(R. 2112, 2215-16) and in addition he continually delayed any effort 
to seek help from the courts to remove Sampson from his position of 
general partner. (R. 2248-49) . 
Since a general partner is obligated by law to pay the debts of 
the limited partnerships the argument advanced by Respondents is 
unusual to say the least. Essentially Respondents seek an award of all 
the monies collected by Sampson during this period of time even though 
the money was used, as found by the court, for the benefit of the 
limited partnerships. Thus, the respondents wish to have the income 
returned to them without the requirement of paying the outgoing 
expenses. 
Respondents have cited no legal authority for this unique 
proposition nor is there any. The facts of this case as well as the 
circumstances relating to Respondents' own conduct during this period 
of time clearly justifies the lower court's conclusion that Respondents 
were not entitled to a credit for the income used by Sampson for the 
benefit of the limited partnerships. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD 
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE LOAN 
ADVANCES THEY HAD MADE TO THE LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS. 
The final contention made on the cross appeal is that the lower 
court should have awarded to the respondents some $700,000 which 
consists of loan advances and interest supposedly made by the general 
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partners to the limited partners. Respondents claim that the lower 
court "inexplicably declined to require Sampson to pay damages" for his 
tortious interference. (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 68-70). 
A review of the Findings, however, shows that the lower court on 
several occasions explained in detail why the advances should not be 
credited to the respondents. First, the court noted the terms of the 
partnership agreements. Article 5 allowed the general partner in its 
discretion to advance monies to the partnerships for use in the 
operation of the partnerships. The agreements provided that such 
advances were not to be deemed capital contributions but that they 
would be immediately due and payable upon the sale of the property or 
the termination and dissolution of the partnership unless otherwise 
agreed upon. (R. 2100) . 
Next, the lower court disputed the figures now urged by the 
respondents in this appeal. The court observed that the original 
settlement agreement between the parties in June of 1980 reflected an 
alleged advance of $393,840 rather than the $585,036 claimed by 
Respondents. (R. 2146). 
The court stated that the proper documentation did not occur: 
The evidence did not contain anything about loan 
instruments having been prepared when such advances 
were made or repayments being made out of gross 
receipts in accordance with the "terms of the loan 
instruments". It being noted here and I so find that 
the promissory notes which Richins prepared on or about 
June 5, 1980 and signed for the partnership as 
president of the general partner, did not constitute 
the "loan instruments" as that term was used in the 
partnership agreement. (R. 2146-47). 
Thus, the lower court found that the required paperwork necessary 
for a proper advance to be credited to the respondents had not been 
made. 
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In addition, the court found that the circumstances triggering the 
repayment requirements of any advance had not occurred. The court 
stated: 
The evidence does not preponderate in showing that 
any of the circumstances mentioned in the partnership 
agreements as triggering the repayment requirements was 
proven to have occurred. (R. 2149) . 
In its Conclusions of Law the court referred to §48-2-23 which 
provides that in settling accounts after dissolution of a limited 
partnership the liabilities shall be entitled to payment in a fixed 
order. The court observed that obligations to general partners was 
fourth on the list after payment to creditors and to limited partners 
with respect to their capital contributions. The court observed: 
It is apparent that repayment of the advances to 
the general partners was conditional upon the end 
results of each partnership, which leave no assurance 
that any partnership, if properly wound up, as provided 
by law and the partnership agreements, would have been 
able to repay any of the obligations owed by it to the 
general partner for such advances. (R. 2260). 
Thus, contrary to the statements contained in Respondents' Brief 
the lower court found that (1) the amount of advances was considerably 
less than that now claimed by the respondents; (2) that the respondents 
had failed to execute the necessary documents and to follow the 
required procedure when advances were allegedly made; (3) that in any 
event, none of the conditions which would have allowed a repayment of 
advances was shown to have occurred and the probability was that the 
partnerships would have no funds sufficient after dissolution to pay 
any obligation remaining to the general partners. 
Again, it should also be noted that had the respondents desired to 
assert their claim of advances it would have been a simple matter back 
in 1980 or 1981 to undertake a dissolution of the partnerships and to 
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wind up the affairs of each partnership. At that time, the general 
partners could have asserted the validity of any claim and distributed 
any assets which were then existing* Instead, however, the respondents 
essentially waited some four or five years to assert their belated 
claim of unpaid advances. 
The Finding and Conclusion of the lower court was therefore 
correct and Respondents are not entitled to any additional judgment for 
alleged advances made. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents have failed to rebut the arguments made by Sampson in 
support of his contention that the lower court erred in awarding 
damages against him. For the reasons previously stated, therefore, 
those awards should be vacated. 
The Respondents on their cross appeal have likewise failed to 
rebut the factual findings and legal conclusions of the lower court 
relating to their claim for additional damages. The lower court was 
correct in denying these damages based upon the facts and circumstances 
of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August, 1988. 
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